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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
tirely upon private beneficence. The arguments against holding mutual
promises binding, as made by Professor Williston, are that the subscrip-
tions are made at different times and directly to the charitable institution
without reference to the other subscribers, and that earlier subscriptions
would be open to the objection of past consideration.6
The state of Georgia has established the modern view by a statute7 which
provides that: "in the mutual subscription for a common object, the promise
of the other is a good consideration." The courts, in interpreting this stat-
ute, have declared that a personal benefit to the promisor is not a neces-
sary prerequisite to the validity of such a contract.8 California supports
the modern view, holding that even if at the time the subscription was
mane there was no consideration, yet if others were induced to subscribe
because of the previous subscription, it becomes binding because of the
reliance of the later subscribers. 9
It is a common belief in the legal profession that the Missouri courts
would follow the modern theory, if such a case arose, and would hold that
the mutual promises of subscribers would constitute consideration sufficient
to make the subscriptions binding.'0 In Methodist Orphans' Home Assoca-
tion v. Sharp there is constructive dictum to the effect that in a different
factual situation "the consideration of the promise of each subscriber is the
corresponding promise made by the other subscribers, and that as the party
for whose benefit a promise is made may sue on it though the considera-
tion is between the promisor and a third person, a subscription by many
to raise money for a charitable purpose in which all feel an interest is
binding on all."
0. J. G.
CORPORATIONS -INFORMAL DECLARATION OF DIVIDENDS- [Missouri],-
Plaintiff was hired by a family corporation under a contract, according to
the language of which he agreed to buy shares of stock by paying the
purchase price out of dividends declared, with no right to the dividends in
cash unless he was discharged before full payment of the price. Until the
6. 1 Williston, Contracts (1st ed. 1927) sec. 116.
7. Georgia Code (1933) sec. 20-304. This statute is limited to writ en
promises only. Y. M. C. A. v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075 (1913).
8. Glass v. Grant, 46 Ga. App. 327, 167 S. E. 727 (1933); Miller v.
Oglethorpe University, 24 Ga. App. 388, 100 S. E. 784 (1919); Y. M. C. A.
v. Estill, 140 Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075 (1933); Wilson v. First Presbyterian
Church, 56 Ga. 554 (1875); Jackson v. Forward Atlanta Comm. Inc., 39
Ga. App. 738, 148 S. E. 356 (1929); Lagrange Female College v. Carey,
168 Ga. 291, 147 S. E. 390 (1929).
9. First Trust & Saving Bank of Pasadena v. Coe College, 47 P. (2d)
481 (1935) ; University of Southern Cal. v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39, 283
Pac. 949 (1929).
10. Charitable institutions have been raising money by this method in
St. Louis for a number of years, without any case going to the Missouri
appellate courts.
11. Methodist Orphans' Home Association v. Sharp, 6 Mo. App. 150
(1878).
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said dividends equalled the full price, no stock was to be issued to him,
nor was he to have any right to vote the shares. The business prospered,
and the president of the corporation who had been intrusted with the
management of the business by the only other shareholders and officers,
credited plaintiff with a certain amount of the profits on the books of the
corporation. The plaintiff was the only shareholder to whom the alleged
dividend applied. The question arose, upon plaintiff's discharge before full
payment of the shares, whether this credit amounted, in effect, to a declara-
tion of a dividend. Held: that this crediting of the plaintiff on the books
of the corporation with a portion of the profits amounted to a declaration
of a dividend in his favor.1
The question arises whether the president had the power to declare a
dividend, and if he has, whether this was a dividend.
A corporate dividend has been defined as that portion of the profits and
surplus funds of the corporation which has been actually set apart by a
valid resolution of the board of directors for distribution among the share-
holders according to their respective interests.2
Ordinarily the power to declare dividends is vested in the board of direc-
tors alone, and not in the shareholders or corporate officers. 3 But it has been
held that when all the shareholders, including all the directors of a cor-
poration, meet and agree to a division of the profits, and such agreement
is executed, the corporation is bound thereby,4 and where the officers of a
corporation distribute the profits among the shareholders without authoriza-
tion by either the directors or shareholders, the corporation may be bound
by the acquiescence of all the shareholders.5 And, where the rights of
creditors are not impaired, the distribution of the profits of a corporation
among its shareholders without any action on the part of the board of
directors, but by the consent or agreement of all the shareholders, is the
equivalent of a dividend.6
1. Brown v. Luce Mfg. Co., 96 S. W. (2d) 1098 (Mo., 1936).
2. 2 Thompson, Corpo'rations (1927) sec. 2126.
3. Hamblock v. Lawn Mower Co., 148 Ill. App. 618 (1909); R. S. Mo.
1929, sec. 4942 provides that dividends may be declared by the directors
every six months or oftener, as the directors may elect. Under this statute,
shareholders cannot, even in the most formal manner and by a unanimous
vote, declare a dividend and enforce its payment without the consent of the
directors. Milligan v. Milligan, 207 Mo. App. 432, 233 S. W. 506 (1921).
4. Spencer v. Lowe, 198 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 8, 1912); Quinn v. Quinn, 201
Mich. 664, 167 N. W. 898 (1918); Thiry v. Window Glass Co., 81 W. Va. 39,
93 S. E. 958, L. R. A. 1918B, 1048 (1917) ; Shaw v. Ansaldi, 165 N. Y. Supp.
872 (1917), where it was held that where the directors are the sole share-
holders, their action in voting themselves salaries may amount to the
declaration of a dividend. Griffin v. Brody, 167 N. Y. Supp. 725 (1917),(only two shareholders and both agreed to divide corporate property-held
to amount to a dividend.)
5. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Central Trust Co. of N. Y., 135 Ga. 472, 69 S. E.
708, (1910) ; Knight v. Alamo, 190 Mich. 223, 157 N. W. 24, 6 A. L. R. 789
(1916).
6. In Chattanooga Bank v. Brewer, 9 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A. 6, 1925), it
was held to be a dividend where the corporate profits were distributed with-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/19
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In the instant case all the stock was owned by two brothers and their
mother, and they comprised all the officers and directors of the corporation.
The corporation was looked upon by them as their private business and they
conformed to only such laws and regulations relative to the corporation
as was necessary to keep the charter alive.7 It would seem, therefore, that
the court was entirelyojustified in holding that the president was authorized
to declare a dividend, since all the shareholders, directors and officers had
given him full power to run the business, and had acquiesced in his course
of dealings. It would be a useless adherence to the strict rules of formality.
to hold that they could only have declared the dividend in a meeting of the
board of directors as such.
The court goes on to say that it is a valid dividend even though not
applicable to all the shareholders. The court recognizes the fact that ordi-
narily dividends must be distributed to the shareholders proportionately
to their several holdings.8 But it cannot be doubted that the shareholders
may, by unanimous consent, adopt and become bound by a different mode
of division.9 This was the case in Brown v. Luce. The court points out
that although the business was operated under a corporate form, it was
regarded as the individual property of the three owners, and they were
not interested in making any distribution of the profits as regards them-
selves, whereas the plaintiff was not so situated.
A sounder basis for the decision would have been that in the contract of
employment, the corporation impliedly promised that it would, when the
conditions justified it, set apart a sum of money measured by the amount
of dividends declared out of the corporate profits.10 The contract between
plaintiff and defendant corporation was, fairly construed, a contract to
create shares in the future. The distinction between a contract to create
shares in the future and a present sale of stock is that a present purchaser
has certain attributes in the way of rights, privileges, and liabilities, ordi-
narily including title, that do not attach to one contracting to become a
out any formal action by the two sole shareholders among themselves in
proportion to their respective holdings. The same result was reached where
two men who owned all the stock, and who constituted two out of the three
directors, divided the proceeds of the sale of corporate property between
them. In re Wilson's Estate, 85 Ore. 604, 167 Pac. 580 (1917).
7. Brown v. Luce, supra, note 1, at 1099.
8. Ibid. p. 1101.
9. In Coal Co. v. Rogers, 216 Ky. 440, 288 S. W. 342 (1926) held that a
solvent corporation, with the consent of its shareholders, all of whom were
directors, could declare and pay a dividend to retiring shareholders repre-
senting their interest in individual profits, no rights of creditors being in-
volved, and the fact that the dividend is disguised as a payment of salaries
for fictitious services was immaterial.
10. Cf. Bennet v. Millville Imp. Co., 67 N. J. L. 320, 51 At. 706 (1902),
which held that the payment to an employee of a corporation, as compensa-
tion, of a percentage of the profits of the business, was only the wages of
the employee, and not a division of the accumulated profits to which the
shareholders were entitled. For a full discussion of Employee Stock Pur-
chase Plans, see 8 N. C. L. Rev. 161.
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shareholder in the future." In the instant case no title was to pass until
final payment, nor was the plaintiff to have any right to vote the shares,
nor was any stock to be issued to him. Since plaintiff was not a share-
holder, therefore, he should not be allowed to recover the money on the
theory that it represented dividends, but he should be allowed to recover
it on the implied promise of the corporation that it would allocate a sum
of money to him which would be measured by the amount of profits. The
amount with which plaintiff was credited on the books of the corporation
would be good evidence as to what a dividend would have been had one
been declared.12
G. M.
CORPORATIONS--LIAILITY or STOCKHOLDER FOR SHARES ISSUED IN VIOLA-
TION or BLUE SKY LAws-[Kansas].--The effect of participation in the
affairs of a corporation on the rights and liabilities of a purchaser of stock
sold in violation of the Blue Sky laws, though seldom considered by the
courts, is important in view of the oft-quoted statement that such stock
is void, or, in some jurisdictions, voidable at the purchaser's option.' In a
recent case a trustee in bankruptcy of a corporation sued to recover from
a stockholder the amount of an unpaid subscription. The Kansas Supreme
Court stated, though the point was not raised by the pleadings, that as the
defendant was an incorporator, director, treasurer and member of the
executive committee, he could not avail himself of the defense of the com-
pany's noncompliance with the Kansas Securities Act.2 The fact that the
company was insolvent and that the defendant was so actively engaged in
its affairs, of course, presented the case in its strongest light.
Except in the jurisdictions where sales in violation of the Blue Sky
laws are valid,3 a person who has merely contracted for the purchase of
stock, without being active in the corporate business, may rely on the de-
fense of illegality in a suit by a solvent corporation for the purchase price.4
11. Stern v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 207 N. W. 737 (1926).
12. Transport Co. v. Jones, 260 U. S. 747, 43 S. Ct. 248, 67 L. ed. 493
(C. C. A. 4, 1922); Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter, 34 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A.
10, 1929).
1. Regan v. Albin et al., Golden Eagle Milling Co. v. Same, 26 P. (2d)
475, 476 (Cal., 1933) (void); Rice v. Allison, 229 Ill. App. 1 (1922) (void-
able); 14 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Private Corporations (Rev. ed. 1932) sec.
6763. Even where the transaction is said to be void, the effect is merely to
make it voidable on the part of the purchaser, since he may recover the
consideration paid. Otten v. Riesener Chocolate Co., 82 Cal. App. 83, 254
Pac. 942 (1927).
2. Norton v. Lamb, 62 P. (2d) 1311, 1313 (Kan., 1936).
3. The view taken by these courts is that their state Blue Sky law is
penal in its nature, in no way affecting the contract made in violation of the
act. Warren People's Market Co. v. Corbett, 114 Ohio St. 126, 151 N. E. 51
(1926), criticized in Comment, 35 Yale L. J. 881 (1926); Watters & Martin
v. Homes Corp., 136 Va. 114, 116 S. E. 366 (1923).
4. Witt v. Trustees' Loan & Savings Co., 33 Ga. App. 802, 127 S. E.
810 (1925); 14 Fletcher, op. cit., sec. 6770.
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